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Violence as a problem
As a theoretical field, the anthropology of violence bas been expanding
rapidly1 in recent years. There has been an upsurge in both case studies
and comparative study of conflict and violence. African examples have
received prominent attention in this respect, although the continent is not
an exception in being more or less violent than other areas. The renewed
attention to violence from many academie disciplines study has led to
calls for unified "théories of violence". While it is not likely that new
grand théories will be forthcoming, it is appropriate to put the analysis
of violence as interaction more central in social and cultural analysis.
Although violence as a subject has not been neglected in général social
theory and history or in anthropology, social studies which systematically
address violent interaction as a basic dimension in the (re)production of
human sociality are still relatively scarce.2
For this there are ideological reasons, contained in the long tradition
of Western thought on the social order, where violence is—despite its
ubiquity—usually seen as a problematic aberration, a non-rational, uncon-
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trolled mode of action signifying a régression to a wild state of "nature".
There may also be scientific reasons: problems of the définition of "vio-
lence", the reluctance in the comparative study of culture to ground the
analysis of violence in the dialectic of basic human prédispositions ("biol-
ogy") on the one hand and the realm of t social lire and culture on the
other, and the relative infrequency of violence in research settings (and
its inaccessibility and danger when it occurs).
Various theoretical moments have characterised anthropological studies
on violence so far. It has been emphasised, especially in American
cultural anthropology, that aggression and warfare are culturally mediated
phenomena, and not just the reflection of an innate human urge which
just has to come out everywhere. Cultural materialist approaches have
stressed the environmental-ecological logic of conflict (cf. Bennett Ross
1980). There has, however, recently been a renewed interest in evolu-
tionary approaches which stress the "compétition for reproductive success"
of persons within a population (e.g., Chagnon 1988a, 1988b, 1992; Betzig,
Borgerhoff Mulder & Türke 1988), and which counters such earlier cul-
turalist points of view.
In the anthropological study of "tribal warfare" as developed, e.g., in
Papua New Guinea-studies since World War II, ecological-materialist thé-
ories have been important. They are revived in modern approaches which
emphasise "resource compétition" as the framework of conflict and vio-
lence (cf. Ferguson 1984; Markakis 1994). It is often difficult to measure
and analyse this theoretical notion. The entities said to "compete" (indi-
viduals or groups) are always assumed to do so largely outside the socio-
cultural framework within which this définition of reality is constructed
and reproduced. "Compétition for scarce resources" can indeed be a
concern perceived as such in many societies in conditions of social hier-
archy, scarcity, population density and power struggle. But this idea of
compétition is not sufficient for a theoretical explanation of violence.
Violent action, like other social behaviour, can be more fully under-
stood in a theoretical perspective which sees humans as social animais
(i.e. with psycho-biological prédispositions) with a capacity for symbol
manipulation and social construction of "meaning". This capacity is not
to be seen as a simple reflection of social conditions, but as a dimension
which enters into thé very définition of reality itself by both subjects and
observers. Such a perspective, based on Weberian ideas about power and
legitimacy, should be able to deal also with the ambiguity of the manifold
social actions in every society which can be labelled as violent. Few if
any societies are consistently "pacifist" in rejecting all violence: in some
conditions it is seen and experienced by many as necessary, inévitable,
justified, or even psychologically rewarding.
In this article, we examine the construction and expression of violence
among the Suri (or Surma) of southern Ethiopia, a pre-literate, non-
industrial society which does not share our (Hobbesian) model of man
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(Turton 1994a: 21), 'iWhilein overall terms this groüpicannotï toe
more violent'than^ for instance, people in Western industrial spcietyvït^is
a setting within which the wótkings of* some "elementâry rules^of»violerai
behaviour" might be observed. 'The case may teil usiaboat ,this cultural^
symbolic dimension of violence i0 a small-scale non-stratified society, andf
may enable us to qualify the often-heard statement that violent behaviour
is meaningless and irrational—on the contrary, it is nearly always "meao-!
ingful" (cf. Blok 1991). In some respects, violence can be an "organising
principle" in society, not only in moments of crisis but also to structure
a part of human expérience and values. Whether the Suri or related
groups can be said to have a "culture of violence" is a debatable point.
This concept has questionable analytical value, and carries the danger of
essentialising a group tradition which is in reality fluid and adaptive. It
is, however, a term in the local discourse used by their peasant neighbours,
victimised by their raids.
David Riches (1991: 295) has described violence as: ".. .contestably
rendering physical hurt." This refers to social interaction whereby inten-
tional harm is done, and where the views of perpetrator and victim (and
witnesses) are the issue of dispute, these parties being conscious of the
problematic aspects and of different views on the (il)lêgitimacy of the
harm donc. The définition also points to the fact that violence, even in
its most crude and aimless forms, always has an aspect of "communica-
tion"—be it as a statement of social protest, of intimidation, or of self-
assertion—and thus of certain cultural values. Violence is also "rupture",
immédiate and challenging action, demanding a response. It may in all
cases be tied to questions of social honour, of the integrity of the person
or of the group.
This communicative, or perhaps performative, définition of violence
was perhaps meant as a step toward a theoretical framework and for a
more adequate ethnography of violence, which assume its universality but
also see the culturally quite varying degrees of defining or contesting
some social behaviour as "violent". But the définition excludes several
forms of action which we would call violence from an outsider's point
of view, e.g. when rendering hurt or intimidating persons, or for that
matter, animais, is not in a particular culture seen as contestable (yet).
For instance, Bloch's description (1992) of the sacrificial rite as being
violent (the shedding of blood through killing, with the purpose of "appro-
priating" some other being's life force) will not count as such in many
cultures.
Hère we intend to folio w a wider or "weaker" définition, along Bloch's
unes. It is too restricted to only speak of violence when bloodshed among
humans and destruction of the social order are involved. The challenge
is to look for thé cultural roots and antécédents of violent response in
order to trace how aggressive, destructive and murderous violence of
people could at ail émerge. The local people and thé représentatives of
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thd state in the area whichawill deseribeé here sÉy^thaï^the t
(their disregard for lèfé and"prbpértyr theinüaäling, Aeinambtts'Kmg.antt
kiiling others) "is simplyäin their culture". Do so®tf statemâÉs tóatee»any
sense? To answer it, a loose définition ©f violence'is irieededï violence* is!
the human use of symbols and acts of intimidation ànd/or damaging




Chai-Suri society: the ecological, poittical and social setting
The Suri are a Nüo-Saharan (Surmic)-speaking group of agro-pastoralists,
somewhat comparable to other East African peoples *many of which have
been well-studied in anthropology (Nuer, Dinka, Maasai5 ^Turkana, Kari-
mojong). Their history is still shrouded in mystery, altihtough they have
clear lingiiistic and cultural connections to other (Para)Nilotic groups in
the région. At present they cultivate a strong group identity, an'aversion
toward a settled agricultural way of life, a "warrior ethos" (on which more
below), and a cultural focus on cattle. For the most part of their recorded3
history of some 200 years, thé Suri were independent cattle-herders in the
Ethio-Sudanese borderland. The Suri-region came under thé Ethiopian
state in thé early 20th Century, but, being remote from thé central high-
lands, it was never well connected or integrated into it. The Suri hâve
two sub-groups—Tirma and Chai—, and the rest of mis essay will speak
about thé Chai, some 16,000 people. They live in thé area southwest of
thé small town of Maji, about 60 miles north of Lake Turkana (see Map).
Environ mental and economie factors
The Chai land is a lowland zone south of thé Maji highlands of South-
western Ethiopia, near thé border with Sudan. The land is fertile due to
thé volcanic soil, but rainfall is unreliable, especially in thé plains where
thé Chai keep their cattle-herds. The rain is insufficient for permanent,
intensive agriculture, and does not guarantee the successful shifting cul-
tivation of staple crops (maize and sorghum). Apart from cattle-herding
and cultivation thé Suri are engaged in hunting. At the end of the dry
season (March-April), there is a problem of water and pasture, with staple-
food supplies running very low. They hâve both agricultural and agro-
pastoral groups as neighbours.
The most prized possession of the Suri are their cattle-herds. Cattle
do not provide more than about a third of thé food supply (milk, blood,
occasionally méat) but are a store of wealth which can be traded for grain
3 In oral tradition.
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in times of need. In a cultural sense, the possession of cattle is intimately
tied up with Chai social personality, adulthood and individual dignity,
both for men and women (who also have rights of possession). Young
men are expected to be committed to herding the cattle and defending it
against raiding outsiders. On this basic level—i.e. that of their mode of
subsistence and of "compétition for resources"—the readiness to confront
and use violence (repulsing and/or killing the raider-enemies) is an essen-
tial "requirement" of the present Suri way of life, and is not seen in any
sense as problematic or contested.
Interna! relations
The Chai have no "chiefs", but only a ritual leader or figurehead (called
komoru). All komorus come from the same ancient clan. He is chosen
by consensus, and installed by elders in a special ceremony. He has no
executive or commanding authority when in function. His main rôle is
to be a focal point of normative unity of all Chai. The British anthro-
pologist D. Turton, in his work on the related Mursi (cf. Turton 1975:
180), has called the priest-like figure of the komoru a "conductor of
absolute power" (connected to the sky-god Tumu). The komoru, through
his blessings is expected to emphasise values of restraint, to be non-
violent, and to reconcile the various domestic units, clan groups and local
communities if need be.
The Chai also know an âge-grade System (for mâles), with four ritually
separated grades, of which thé third one (called rorä) provides thé "reign-
ing" one and has its own name (like an âge-set name). This grade provides
thé main decision-makers and authority figures. Women dérive âge-grade
status from their husbands, and are not separately initiated.4
Chai live in compact villages, with members from various clans. A
clan identity is only important for thé choice of marriage-partners (exo-
gamy). Several villages form a territorial unit (called b'urari), which
originated as a co-operative herding unit of its members. Domestic units
led by married women are thé foci of daily social life. There is little
stratification in terms of possessions and wealth. Social relations outside
village or b 'wran-membership are formed on the basis of ritual bond-
friendship (established through cattle-exchange), with other Suri as well
as with non-Suri.
Inter-ethnic relations
Chai society, both internally and in its relations to other ethno-cultural
groups, is marked by fréquent violence. The latter comprises, among
4. More on thé authority structure among thé Chai, in ABBINK (1997).
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other things, intër-ethnic conffitts'îîn%he^form of'ambèbhes, robbèïfès.lÉid»
killings. These seem to have gained in intensity in the last decade (see
Abbink 1993b, ° 1994). There are indications that >external factors, such
as the nature of state—local society relations, changes^ im the^regiônab
power balance, as well as the influx of technologtealLf advanced automatic
rifles have played a décisive rôle hère. These factors, to which we j return
below, have partly disturbed the "ritual control" of violence within Chai
society itself.
Chai violence8 has indeed always moved between the two pôles of
ritual Containment and political strategy. The former element wasnrelated
to keeping equilibrium in their own society, the latter to safeguarding
access to pasture, water holes, fields, and natural resources vis-à-vis other
pastoralist groups (Nyangatom, Toposa and Mursi), and agricultural neigh-
bours (Dizi, highlanders). In recent years there have been additional
political-ecological factors at play, and these have brought them in conflict
with the Anuak and the agricultural Dizi people as well (see Abbink
1993a). Especially the relations with the latter, now their most immédiate
neighbours, deserve to be considered.
Historically, the Chai were located near Mt. Naita (also called Shu-
lugui), a border mountain between Sudan and Ethiopia. According to
their oral traditions they were formed or just "arrived" in this area about
two-hundred years ago. However, in the past decade, the Chai gradually
have filtered into areas formerly used by the Dizi people for cattle-herding,
hunting and apiculture. The Dizi were an hierarchical chiefdom society,
with elaborate rank distinctions, since the early 20th Century heavily
exploited and decimated by the northern Ethiopian settlers. Relations
between Dizi and Chai are important for two reasons: a) both Dizi and
Suri traditions maintain that their leading families have a common descent
and cannot intermarry; b) they had instituted a kind of ritual alliance in
matters of rain-control. While the Chai leaders were ascribed rain-making
powers in the lowlands, the final authority on this was ascribed to the
Dizi chiefs in the adjacent mountains (see Haberland 1993: 253). Under
this "rain-pact" itself, the Chai—in times in drought, food shortage, cattle
disease or other problems—were permitted to enter the areas claimed by
the Dizi. This important cultural agreement was a kind of temporary
sealing of a balance between these groups, codifying the exploitation of
different but partly overlapping and complementary ecological niches:
there was—and still is—economie exchange between them (cattle, pot-
tery, iron products, grain, garden crops). There was also frequent inter-
marriage, although mostly in the form of Chai men talking Dizi wives,
in itself a sign of Chai dominance.5
In the course of time, the Dizi—who also kept cattle in the lowlands—came to
adopt several customs related to the "cattle-culture" of the Chai, but they never
developed a comparable assertive ethos, emphasizing e g, personal violent per-
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Suri culture and the ethos of assertiveness
It was noted above that on the level of the Chai mode of subsistence and
the readiness to confiront raider-enemies, violence is emphatically present.
What is more, it is not seen in any sensé as problematic or contested.
But the Suri attitude towards violence is more than just essential self-
defence. An imagery of tension or violent moments is woven into many
aspects of Chai life, into ideals of manhood or social personality, and in
genera! in a ritually expressed concern with what we might call "expansive
reproduction": the growth of herds and of family and off spring. For
outsiders, this attitude is reflected in many cultural metaphors which
permeate Chai (Suri) culture6, and even in the self-name "Chai", taken to
mean "We revenge, we pay (them) back". For the Chai themselves, this
imagery or symbolism of "violence" does not count as problematic either.
We immediately note two things: first that this "violent imagery" is
mainly an aspect of the construction of the male gender. Females, while
sharing the values underlying it, are not socialised to perform it except
in a verbal manner. Second, we see that this imagery or symbolism is
not seen as problematic or as referring to "violence" by the Chai them-
selves. This is done only by external observers.
The various realms of social discourse which serve to construct shared
cultural scénarios for the Chai—and which are even shared in outline by
their pastoralist Nyangatom neighbours, very similar to them in way of
life—might also be said to have psychological aims: first, to force new
members of society to overcome the fear of violence, of armed attack, of
wounding and killing. Interestingly, Chai say that young boys have to
learn to suppress a "natural inhibition" against the spilling of blood and
against violently inflicting harm. A second aim may be to inculcate the
idea of the immanence of violence, i.e. death, or the flowing of blood, in
various stages and crucial moments of the life-cycle. When these two
aims are achieved, violence is both domesticated, "embodied", and made
instrumentally useful7.
This violent imagery is expressed in at least the following three cultural
metaphors/schemas, which teil us about the indigenous Chai conceptions
about human motivations and relations. These are important if we want
to advance anthropological theorising about violence and warfare and their
relation to culture (cf. Turton 1994b: 25).
• The sacrificial metaphor. — The équation of the killing and offering
of a consecrated (domestic) stock animal with bénéficiai effects for
formance, militant defence of the cattle herds, or a spécifie décorative "body
culture".
6. Culture we define here as the more or less durable, shared and transmitted
patterns of behaviour in which collective ideals and norms of a group are
expressed and which form an element of identity formation.
7. See part 4.
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humans. This is done at certain icer@mojiutafcfo^ca|ions, t fo |̂nstance:
marriage, burial, age-group initiation,1 a rainN?er.elpjëny, dtostalJAïoife of* a
komoru, and also at a major public Hebaté, or someèimés ïn ca$eiofiaserdous
illness.8 The eore ideas behind putting' a consebra^tèil animal tóMèath ar©
perhaps: substitution and vicarious victimisatiôn, bêcau^ë*4he violence is
performed for the benefit of sthe human sacrificers. Maurice%Blocl> (1992)
has called it "rebounding violence", whereby the "vitality" of a live being
once killed ritually is deflected töwards humans (utilised for human pur-
poses). The effectiveness of the sacrifice is predicated^upbrFthe' cldsb
(social) bond between humans and domestic (livestock)Manimals. The
cattle also provide the bride wealth, and thus the medium for marriage
and, ultimately, fertility. The flowing of blood thus is seen as essential,
yielding bénéficiai results. The idea of sacrifice was also relevant in the
context of inter-group relations (see below).
• The purification metaphor. — The idea of purification is pervasive in
Chai culture. People involved in homicide or in handling corpses at
burials but also in adultery are8 to be temporarily isolated and cleansed.
They can only be made "normal" members of society again by, cleansing
themselves with the freshly spilt blood of a stock animal. To purify, in
this respect, means to kill and to use the life-force of the animal which
was killed, and which stood as the "killer". Humans only then are able
to re-enter social life. At the same time, to purify with the fresh blood
is to redraw a boundary between individuals who were earlier socially
separated by their violence.
• The achievement metaphor. — A Chai's personal history or social career
is important. His/her personality and deeds may live on beyond the life-
span, and in this consciousness, people try to make a name for themselves:
as "warriors", cérémonial duellers, public speakers, important family
heads, or ritual experts. Achievements are often laid down in personal
favourite-cattle songs (roga kiyogâ bio) or battle songs (kirogenyö), which
every adult male has. They are composed especially by men in the junior
age-grade (tégay). Most men keep working on such songs during their
whole life, changing and adding text. Such songs can speak of deeds
done in raids and war, in other dealings with neighbouring and/or enemy
peoples, and of actions carried out during the defence of cattle herds and
of their own favourite animais. Violent moments or episodes are an
inévitable and desired element of such achievements.
Another moment of achievement is, of course, gaining adulthood.
This social adulthood is not "just there" when people come of âge, but
must be achieved by having shown valour and personal strength (dem-
onstrated in cérémonial duelling, see below), by capable herdmg, and by
initiation (by elders) into the senior age-grade. For this, they must have
demonstrated their "worthiness". This is a function both of time passing
8 As m most pastoral societies, cattle meat is never eaten outside a ritual context
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and of appropriate »behavisur^ofiijthe «junior grade (seé* Mbbh
Hence, adulthood cannot just be taken—-itfis onlsytreluctaiiay accö|ded t®
the newcomers by the outgoing gra<f3„<lfhel$er>s, %ïïhe ritual of the>iniüation
has violent aspects: elders ^mensan^iiw^me^n^fiösult the new candidates,
give them exacting and humiliatingïtasks^tpildo^.deprive them of food,
and lash them with whips until their backs rbleed. e -, ., ,
M ^ ^
These domains reveal underlying values and violent motifs active insthe
constitution of the Chai social person. They are especially articulated
vis-à-vis outsiders. In their turn, these motifs and values inform cultural
scénarios in Chai society. D. Linger (1992) has used the concept of
"cultural scenario" to indicate the expected behavioural "performances"
of values in action. For him, the briga, the violent street-encounter in
Brazilian urban society, follows a known, shared "scenario", a scripted
course of meaningful action in which the participants know what to
expect. It is marked by emotional commitment and shared assumptions
and values. Even though the actions are violent and can end in death,
they are set in a model, which has psychological and cultural co'mponents
inhibiting direct aggression but communicating'lts message. The impor-
tant point is that briga violence, although ambivalent because of its two
pôles of fascination artd restraint, is not aimlesS, cheaotic violence which
suddenly erupts. A similar point can be made for Chai violence, which
also follows cultural scénarios.
The exercise of violence
In this section, the practice of violence, i.e. the production and enactment
of some frequent "violent" behavioural patterns ("scénarios") in Chai
society, is reviewed. Two kinds could be distinguished: the ritually
enacted "domesticated violence", and the external violence, i.e., relating
to non-Chai. In the first instance, violence is transformative, i.e. fulfills
an essential rôle for individual Chai in becoming füll or accepted members
of society; in the second instance, it is constitutive of their own group, a
necessary inversion of peaceful social relations in certain conditions requir-
ing distance between them and others.
Ritual enactment of "domesticated violence"
One finds the following forms expressed within the Chai group:
• Duelling (thagine)9. — A major event of domesticated violence is male
cérémonial duelling. This is done with big pôles made of tough wood,
of ça. 2.10 to 2.40 mètres length. The main contestants are young men
9 In this and other sections I draw partly on matenal first presented m ABBINK
(1993a and 1994).
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of-the tègay âge-grade. (unmarried) coming . ,__„„_„
tlements and/or iclans/ They hold several matchesi and^retum-matcfefs
overfa periodnof a» few months every year, supewfccdHbyflpferees (odM^
The thagine-duel is strictly contained by rules of procédure, iand the lalling
of an opponent, on purpose or accidentai, is prohibited. If^t occ^rê,
homicide compensation should be negotiated. Social relations are per-
ceived to be disturbed between the family groups of victim and killer as
long as a deal is not made. ä " " u
Three aspects of these duels stand out. Fir^t? the thagines ostensibly
is a forum for male compétition and acquisition of culturally approved
status among peers and also vis-à-vis girls. They allow young, ambitious
men, eager to start life as independent household-heads, to show their
strength and virility. This latter aspect is explicitly recognised by nubile
Suri girls: the duelling provides a place of male-female contacts, whereby
girls among themselves rriake a first choice as to whom their partners
might be, although there is no 100 % corrélation of being the winner and
being the most populär person. Second, it can'be interpreted, in psycho-
logical terms, as a training ground for youths to explore the fascination
and energy of violence in a controlled manner. Thîrdly, the duels are
forums where competing village communities within Suri sdeiety meet
(People from the same village ean never compete). On thes« occasions,
where thousands of people gather, one might say that these communities
(called b'urari) are in fact constituted.
• The procedure of homicide compensation (Ifgin). — When an internai
homicide has occurred, thé lineages of victim and perpetrator are in a
state of conflict, whereby m principle revenge can be taken at any
moment. People avoid normal social contacts. After some months, nego-
tiations are started, by neutral members from another lineage or clan
group. These must lead to thé fixing of a compensation sum and to thé
agreement to hand over a young girl to thé victim's group. The killer
and the closest male agnate of the victim must also be purified with thé
blood of a sheep. Without this ordered procédure to restore thé peace,
feuding would ensue.
• "Blessing of the raiders" (dirâm). — This is an essential ritual supervised
and carried out by thé komoru Before going on a raid for cattle, par-
ticipants (who virtually ail are of thé tègay âge-grade) hâve to be blessed
and ntually protected from death and defeat. This is donc m thé com-
pound of the komoru, and should proceed according to a strict and faultless
procedure. The raiders are smeared with a protective black clay and jump
across thorn-bush branches, which symbolically stand for thé enemy.
They also threateningly face thé komoru as if to attack him—an act
to challenge his blessing and divert the power which he has (via thé
connection with the sky-god)10 The speeches by elders and the blessmgs
10 In thé film The Mursi (1974, Granada TV, Disappearmg World series UK) the
similar ritual among thé Mursi, "speanng thé priest", is shown
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of the komoru are Ml of violent imagery, cursing» the eneroies, cailing
upon the raiders to be fearless and dauntless in their attacks. Theys are
expected to make effective? use of violence and to come badk witteglory
(they announce their "successful" mission upon return in their villaige äwith
a special boasting song). In the knowledge that the opponents do exactly
the same, there is hère again no controversy on the use of violence.
• The ritual killing of livestock (nitha). — This is a very common event,
violent although not directed at humans. It is done when people have
killed some one (on purpose or by accident), at an initiation-ceremony, a
divinatory intestine-reading, a marriage, or a burial. The ideas of sub-
stitution and of cleansing through blood and death come back here. The
manner in which the cattle or sheep are killed has its own meaning, but
is seen as cruel by outsiders: it varies from cutting the throat, or slowly
bludgeoning an animal to death (cattle), to slitting open the stomach before
it is dead (sheep).
• Body culture. — One could see certain Chai body treatments as violent,
though they are again not "contested" (except by government agents, who
discourage it): the piercing of lips and ear-lobes with sticks and insejting
big wooden and clay dises; the making of scarifications with a razor blade
on the arms, back and abdomen of women; the kicking out of lower
incisors with a stone, and the "honorific" nöfo-scarifications (carved in
the skin by an âge-mate) for people who have killed. In all these cases,
blood flows and pain is inflicted, but only in order to enhance culturally
styled personal purposes: respectively aesthetics, age status, and personal
achievement and prestige in the eyes of peers. It is not seen as a contested
infliction of harm. This is all part of the self-conscious cultural body-
aesthetics which Chai emphasise vis-à-vis other groups, and which is, for
instance, completely lacking among the Dizi people.
External violence: ritual and political
We have seen that the Chai had social relations of exchange, ritual
friendship bonds (laaie), and of joint exploitation of pasture and water
resources with their Mursi, Nyangatom, Dizi and other neighbours. These
groups had close social ties with them, which were fully taken for granted.
But, with the exception of the Mursi, such groups remained outside the
Suri "moral Community". As the complementary side of these social
bonds, the Chai always knew various forms of violent behaviour and
conflict in their dealings with them:
• thé stealing of crops and individual cattle without violent assault. Thèse
matters, if thé culprits could be found, were resolved through talks and
compensation on an individual or family level;
•'s
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• ambushes, to kill au individual1 or traveller fcomi another^ethrifelpgtoup
either to rob grain, clothes, tools^a^gun, or cattle, or!just tOfkill to sproke
personal "courage" (by a tègay, a junior age-grade imember); '
• the raiding!ofsenemy cattle camps or compounds, with violent deatfas
of both defendèrs and attackers. These were short hitand-run raids, with
a brief and intense attack under a barrage *of rifle-firë and *>a quick retreat ;
• occasionally: destructive one or two-day foattles to destroy enemy set-
tlements or wipe out its people. This was battle-warfare (kaman), and
was the most serious form of violent interaction bêtween two ethnie
groups. Chai have had such fights with all their neighbours, except the
Mursi. The primary purpose in such large-scale attacks was to steal
cattle, but also women and children were captured, who were1 then incor-
porated in Chai society. While the violence used was intense and often
deadly (hacking with knives and spears, shooting at close range) forms
like rape or torture of the enemies were, höwever, unknown.
As one can see, the context of this external violence may be partly
"resource compétition" and partly political strategy: the (re^drawing of
group or territorial boundaries between political units. 'They do not fight
because they are "separate groups", but the reverse: in order to become
different. This also holds for the Chai in their dealings with neighbouring
groups (compare the same argument on the Mursi by Turton 1994).
Relations with the agro-pastoralist Nyangatom were based on an
implicit and recognised balance between two similar groups. They had
a comparable acephalous organisation and age-group System, a similar
subsistence base, etc. Violence was a "normal" social activity, not prob-
lematized as such. It also had a code of conduct: even in serious things
like cattle-raiding, for instance, there was the rule of the preliminary
marking (in the neck) of a few cattle from a targeted herd before the
actual raid would take place. Conflict between the Chai and Nyangatom
was, in sum, a way to express or assert a boundary with the "significant
other". The killing of a Nyangatom allowed a Suri man to make the
prestigious ridö scarification on his arm.
With the agricultural Dizi people, who dominate the highlands north-
east of the Suri and have a very different economy, culture and political
ideology, relations were not based on perceived similarity. The Chai
always had a disdain for the Dizi and their sedentary, agricultural way of
life. But their obvious group différences—despite the myth of common
descent of their chiefly families—were codified in an explicit "contract"
of rain control, based on the metaphor of sacrifice. In times of drought,
the Chai would pay homage to the Dizi chief of the highlands, bringing
a black ox and a black goat for sacrifice by the Dizi chief. The political
tension (between two basically unequal groups) was "appeased" in this
agreement, thus keeping inter-group violence at bay through the metaphor
of ritual sacrifice (substitutive violence). There were incidents between
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individuals of the two ethnie groups, but no major violent conflicts or
battles. Neither did Suri apply the n'dd-markings.
The above éléments shape the Suri practice of violence and define
their habitus (in Bourdieu's sense defined as human dispositions acquired
in society due to a process of internalisation of external "objective" social
conditions). The habitus is also incorporated into action, feeling and
thinking of individuals in a spécifie society, often in a quite literal sense,
since the emphasis is on the bodily basis of these dispositions. This is
also evident among the Suri. A habitus is, however, not static.
"Deranged" violence? Transformations of the violent habitus
Since a decade, the face of violence among the Chai and their neighbours
has changed significantly. Although the traditional situation of "normal"
relations between the ethnie groups in the area was not always harmonious
and should not be glorified, it is apparent that the past years have shown
a serious crisis in inter-ethnic relations. This kind of situation is becoming
genera! in many parts of Africa due to internai and external factors, often
in the context of globalisation, bringing together various sphères of inter-
action and articulating conflicts of interests. Traditional rituals and cus-
tomary law usually cannot achieve what they were designed for in bygone
days. Local societies are structurally unable to maintain their integrity
and moral fibre due to accelerated drought and famine problems, popu-
lation pressure, faulty state policies, tourism (see Abbink 1998a), modern
formai éducation and criminal activities.
As a result of recent political and other changes in the Maji area, both
the internai, thus far ritually contained Suri violence as well as the violence
towards other groups tend to break thé bounds of custom and to turn into
thé uninhibited use of force (this was also the opinion of most Chai elders,
though expressed differently). While it makes available new options for
local people, the new violence tends to endanger the co-existence of groups
as well as the peace in Chai-society itself. Relevant factors have been
population movements in the Ethio-Sudan border area due to the Sudanese
civil war, increased local conflicts about pasture and water holes, periodic
drought and famine, epizootics, a temporary retreat of central state author-
ity from the local scène, and generational conflict among the Suri, all this
coupled with the rapid spread of automatic weapons among all groups,
with changed the extent and intensity of violent encounters (see below).
These factors have contributed to more inter-group conflicts, a décline in
market contacts and a virtual halting of shared use of the environment
and of long-term mutual social contacts (including intermamage and ritual
friendship bonds). A three-year record kept by the author of violent
incidents between the Chai-Suri and Dizi (leaving out the conflicts which
either group has had with another neighbouring population), shows at least
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sixty incidents with a fatal outcome, the number of people being killed
ranging from one to several dozens per case. (With other ethnie groups
like the Anuak and the Nyangatom the Suri also have violent conflicts,
but due to geographical séparation between them, the number of con-
frontations and of casualties has been less than with Dizi and highland
villagers.)
One of the problems to explain is why violence "got out of hand" and
led to a break-down of social relations between the Chai and other groups.
Is it because their cultural models and their habitus were, in a sense,
"violent"? In the course of the conflicts with the Dizi, one can see a
qualitative différence in the view on, and exercise of, violence, especially
among the members of the tègay age-grade (see Abbink 1994): violent
action—attacking and killing—became an aim in itself, a medium of self-
glorification and of personal status which, while based on assumptions
and ideals within Chai society, has gone well beyond them.11
To widerstand why this happened, we recall two genera! factors.
First, the Chai subsistence base. They are transhumant herders and shift-
ing cultivators, not sedentary farmers: they have never invested in long-
term agricultural adaptation but in mobile cattle-herding. For them,
boundaries between "territories" and "resources" are not to be strictly
observed, it is against the nature of their open economy and flexible
"membership policy". If such a closure occurs, due to conquest and
exclusion policies (e.g., of Nyangatom, due in its turn to population growth
and also Kenyan military pressure) or to developments of "sedentarization"
and administrative boundary-making, violent conflict cannot but increase.
This is what has happened in the past decade. There is less and less
room for Chai to follow traditional stratégies of conflict resolution: avoid-
ance, migration, or division and territorial spread of groups.
Second, the process of state expansion in the Maji area. Since the
turn of the Century, when it was nominally incorporated into Ethiopia,
Maji has always been a "frontier area", incompletely administered and on
the margins of the state monopoly on violence. Recent efforts to re-
establish the state after the change of regime in 1991 have "problematized"
all expressions of Suri violence. The state is by nature presenting itself
as the normative, overarching authority which should have the exclusive
use of legitimate force as well as combat "harmful customs". Local
violence of Chai or of any other group is proscribed, regardless of its
context (this was already the case under the previous state-communist
regime of Mengistu). The state représentatives have also, at various
points, tried to prohibit many Chai activities or customs: not only cattle-
raiding, ambushing, etc., but also things like animal sacrifice (the killing
of cattle for divination or funerals), the customs of ear- and lip-plates,
11 In fact to such an extent that it endangered the cohésion of Chai society itself
(See ABBINK 1998b)
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removal of lower incisors, and body scarification (these were called "harm-
ful customs" in the 1987 constitution of the previous regime, a concept
which returns in the policy documents of the post-1991 government).
Recently, in 1994 and after, it was also tried to ban the cérémonial duelling
contests.
It is obvious that tins so-called "civilisational offensive" represents an
assault on the socio-cultural fabric of Chai society. As the Chai are held
responsible for most of the violence in the Maji area, state officials think
that by reforming the what they see as overall "violent character" of Chai
culture they can halt violent conflicts. It is, however, likely that if this
state campaign to "reform" Chai culture—by banning the customs just
mentioned—would be successful (it is not), the violence against non-Chai
would notably increase when these domesticated forms of violent expres-
sion would cease to exist. In addition, while the state discourages or
forbids even Chai self-defence and redressive action against enemy raiders,
at the same time it cannot guarantee defending the Chai and their territory
against such raiders (e.g., from the south or from Sudan), nor protect them
from drought and subsistence crises, factors which necessitate at least
some violent action. More immediately important factors stimulating the
overall use of violence have been:
1. the wide availability of automatic rifles and ammunition from both
Sudanese and Ethiopian sources;
2. continued ecological pressures: drought, cattle disease, more scarcity
of bush land for cultivation and pasture for livestock. There was a major
famine in 1984-85 and again one in 1994, and in one early 1997. This
contributed to theft, ambushes and raiding;
3. the conflict in southern Sudan, which became the source of population
movements in the région, pushing the Toposa to the western borders of
the Suri territory, thus making their pastures and their old ritual sites,
chiefs' burial places and settlements unsafe, and posing a threat to their
physical and also cultural existence.
The effect of such changes in the socio-political and physical envi-
ronment on the Chai, and on their use of violence in their relations with
other groups, has been dramatic, although it is not a one-way causal
chain—the developments in their own society have combined with such
external factors to reinforce crisis and violent conflict.
It could be seen most clearly in the crisis in the age-grade system,
which is the core of their political organisation and internai order (cf.
Abbink 1994, and 1998b). In the age-grade system, the elder or reigning
age-set of róra is to be accorded respect and obédience from the younger
one. They occasionally expect to be honoured and, in a metaphorical
sense, "fed" in récognition of that fact, e.g., by being offered sacrificial
cattle.12 Their blessing of the land and the cattle and their authority on
12. Cf. TORNAY (1989) on the Nyangatom.
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the basis of tage is «een i as ainecessary elementànuthe social order.,
it was resented by the teigriing age-set called Neebi (= "Buffaloes") that
the tègay were always taking, violent initiatives* on their OWB, inotiasan©
L
tioned by public décisions at meetings. The tègay, mostly younger herders
who lived in the cattle camps (in^an area^six hours' walk from*the villages),
could assert themselves because of the power of their rifles and on theh;
growing economie leverage (as herders <and as'gold traders: se&Abbink
1993a). Also in other domains the respect of the younger génération
toward the elders and parents was diminishing, even within families:
personal property and heads of cattle were often taken away by youngsters,
without the consent of the parents.
The growing violence perpetrated by Chai youths initially convinced
Chai elders (who control the date and the proceedings)athat the new age-
set initiation, which was already due in the early 1980s, should be
delayed. With this, they expressed that the Chai first should formulate
an answer to their problems, such as being exiled from their country,
recovering from the drought and famine period in the mid-4980s, running
into trouble with the Dizi and the Anuak (which endangered normal social
relations and trade), and not respecting the elder génération. The tègay
were blamed for all this, and the elders did not have a clear answer to
the problems. The increased violence had brought out internai contra-
dictions in the âge-grade System and the authority structure and norms it
was supposed to uphold. In fact the metaphor of âge organisation as a
cultural model of ordering social life was fundamentally disputed.
The availability of automatic weapons, now acquired by virtually all
men, led also to changes in the concept of violent action and to new
violent practices. Above, we have discussed some core éléments of the
cultural basis of "violent imagery" and action among the Chai. In the
new situation, their values of male achievement and réputation, raiding
and hunting exploits and cérémonial duelling provided a fertile basis for
the expansion of violent performance by means of the new weapons, for
instance:
• compared to the spears, knives and old three or five-shot rifles of less
than a génération ago, the possibilities of the AK-47s (Kalashnikovs),
FALs and M-16s seem to have a fascination and momentum of their own.
Their availability not only leads to mimetic exercise of violent acts by
the tègay vainly seeking récognition still structurally denied to them (see
above: the delayed age-set ceremony), but also giving the possessors the
idea of "social self-sufficiency": they explicitly de-emphasised the value
or even the need of normal social relationships as formerly maintained
with the neighbouring groups;
• the weapons also have been put to new use. For example, there have
been some unprecedented instances of Chai killing their own cattle, to
prevent them from being captured and taken away by enemy raiders (this
has also been observed among the Tirma, and among other newly armed
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pastoral groups in Uganda and Kenya, thesBokot, Turkana, Karimejong,
etc.). There has been the gunning down of IDizi elders arids women^'and
the killing of unaimed Dizi girls in ambushes, things not done in the
recent past. Through this violence, exercised largety with impunity, the
Chai ,and Tirma became more and more saturated with the Peeling of
power, and challenged not only the Dizi peasants but also the state army.
This built up until October 1993, when a big Ethiopianwarrny attack
reputedly caused several hundred of Chai and Tirma (men, women and
children) to die. Only after this obvious defeat, the elders decided to
hold the age-set ceremony, initiating and conferring adulthood on the
"delayed génération" (see Abbink 1998b). Since then, Chai Suri violence
has decreased. The Tirma sub-group, which has not yet performed the
initiation ritual, shows at present a higher level of violence than the Chai.
Two other internai changes in Chai society are the following:
• in the past six or seven years, thé institution of thagine, the cérémonial
duelling, has undergone a metamorphosis. First of all, the frequency of
thé contests has much increased. They are held almost-every two to three
weeks over a period of three to four months after thé main harvest of
sorghum (September-November, and after that as well, äe.g. in January
and in the time of the first rains in April-May. Secondly, the influence
of the elders (including the komoru) and the référées over the contesting
parties has diminished: nowadays, the young men and their friends con-
tinue as they like, and after one party has "lost" one contest, they grab
their Kalaslmikovs and start shooting (usually, but not always, in the air)
to show their irritation. This has led to several accidentai killings. One
can hear the Suri elders say that the meaning of duelling is being eroded.
We see here another cultural scenario in flux, whereby accepted meanings
of violence are transformed;
• there has been an increase in feuding: when a homicide is perpetrated,
Suri seem to lose the patience to sit out the traditional compensation
talks. The kin group of the victim, if strong enough, demands immédiate
damages, or eise call for rétribution. Such feuding conflicts also affected
the family of the komoru. Among the Tirma-Suri, for instance, there has
been a long line of killings between two lineages since one of their two
komorus was accidentally shot dead: by a Tirma. This in itself is unprec-
edented.
The above forms of violent behaviour are now also contested within
Chai society: elders, the komoru, and women especially talk against wanton
violence against Dizi and other travellers, against unprovoked killing and
robbery of former Dizi bond friends, and against the shooting at duelling
grounds.
The changes in the exercise of violence both within and without Chai
society points to major shifts of meaning. In fact, we see a movement
from ritually contained violence to political and instrumental violence, the
aims and meaning of which are less clear to everybody. There is a phase
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of deep uncertainty and sometimes fear, of a transition of meanings.'
There is an awareness that many of the tègay„ génération have abused the
cultural norm of status acquisition on*account of*killmg an adversary: this
happened only in battle with recognised,s long-standing ene'mies (i.e., not
with Dizi and other highlanders except after manifest injustices). The
tègay do it repeatedly, "without a reason", and break the rule of restraint
in violent behaviour.
Concluding remarks
Chai-Suri culture is marked by ideals of male personhood and peer status
which accord value to assertive behaviour which may translate into violent
behaviour when material interests and compétitive economie and social
relations with other groups are involved. Suri culture can, however, only
be called a "culture of violence"—reproducing violent behaviour as a
template, an ideal or a habitus—in its relation to, or opposition to, those
outside their "moral Community".
Chai-Suri expressions of violence have shown important modifications
in recent years. While ecological and material conditions play a rôle in
explaining this, an anthropological, cross-cultural understanding of the
new dialectics of violent action needs to take into account how violent
processes actually unfold on the basis of symbolic-cultural représentations
and how they establish meaning, either instrumental or expressive.
Violence breaks the bounds of culture, of the social System. The
ritualisation of violence is diminishing, more unstructured and unpredict-
able forms émerge. We see hère a society pushing against its own
structural and cultural limits. In relations with neighbouring groups (espe-
cially Dizi and Nyangatom), this Chai violence can still be seen as a
"language", a communicative act, but mainly one of intimidation. Vio-
lence in this sensé "bridges" thé communication failures which hâve
emerged, but it grounds group relations in suspicion and fear—in thé
absence of shared frameworks of control (the breakdown of the rain-
agreement with the Dizi and of the fighting code with thé Nyangatom are
cases in point).
A more neo-functionalist explanation of violent behaviour, as in récent
evolutionary approaches, seems of limited value, because it tends to
assume what has to be demonstrated in each empirical case (cf. Knauft's
criticism, 1987, 1991). For instance, thé interprétation of Chai violence
seems to preclude an easy association between successful raiding or violent
behaviour on the one hand and "reproductive success" on thé other.
Comparing census-material and involvement or prestige in raiding of
dozens of Chai men did not give any direct, meaningful corrélation. The
most important killers were not more populär with women and did not
have more wives and children. Neither did they hâve larger herds.
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Certain rules make accumulation of this sort difficult: the eaptured cattle
is being divided among all participants p£ a raid in a time-consumingsand
laborious procedure. Other facts which réfute such a connection include
the position of the komoru: he usually has a large i number of wives and
children and thé biggest herd of cattle, but he is noted for^his reconciliatory
and mediatory rôle, and bis role-model de-emphasises aggressive behaviour
and aimless violence. We also saw already that in thé thagine cérémonial
duelling thé victors are not the universally populär guys outshining thé
losers: all participants regardless of their place on the list of honour are
esteemed. f-
What thé examination of thé Chai case makes clear is that in certain
conditions "violence" is deemed an essential, inhérent part of social life,
and need not be "contested" in thé sensé of categorically rejected by
victim and perpetrator. This was true for thé Chai and thé Nyangatom—
both the same focus on cattle herding, both with a stratum of "warrior-
herders", and with thé underlying idea that "violent self-assertion", in
ritual as well as in group defence, was, in their view, inévitable. When
people were killed it was said to have been "bad luck" for them, caused
by, for instance, failing ritual protection, but it was not contested in itself.
With the Dizi case it was different, but we have seen how their perception
of illegitimate, excessive Chai violence in récent years was partly generated
by thé breach of a previous "historical contract", and by changing regional
and state-local society relationships, where different forms of incorporation
into overarching political structures and value Systems (as expressed in
the fight over the monopoly on the means and exercise of violence) of
both groups led to regional discrepancies and conflicts.
Traditional Chai violence is a concomitant of their evolved survival
stratégies as lowland cattle-herders in a precarious natural and human
environment. Their communient to the herds, to feeding, defending, and
expanding them, has led to a close socio-cultural bond between humans
and cattle, symbohcally elaborated in their culture and values of social
personhood and achievement. Violence is, however, not simply a "selec-
tively advantageous trait" of Chai behaviour. Their values and ideals
certainly reflect a complex violent imagery, but at the same time a per-
vasive sociality within and beyond their society, suggesting that, on this
elementary level also, both are inextricably linked. This again shows the
ambiguity of violence as a category of social action: it constitutes and it
undermmes sociality, the latter especially when released from its cultural
formulations.
When the Chai mode of existence is undermined, either by long-term
disturbances in ecological conditions or in the inter-group and state rela-
tions putting them at a disadvantage, a recourse to more hard violence
will be hkely Traditional understandings between local groups then
further lose importance, the regional equilibrium is disturbed, and an
overarching accepted state structure is not present. Also, the availability
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of modern weapons and plenty of ammunition has had a seductive effect
on Chai young men, prompting them to use violence beyond any instru-
mental necessity. As we saw, this has led to serious internai contradictions
within Chai society, and to décisive changes in traditional Chai meanings
of violence.
In most of the situations which we presented, violence in Chai society
can be seen as a means to symbolically construct a group identity, or
"we-consciousness"—it is not there automatically. This consciousness is
based upon ideas of clan descent or affiliation, language, and a cultural
aesthetics expressed in décorative customs, but forged into an enduring
group identity—or at least into one valid for some purposes—within the
network of compétitive and exchange relations with other groups in the
région. As such, violence is inévitable, a fact of life, and not in any
sense problematic or destructive or an irrational régression to evil human
nature. When we talk about the violent "images" in Chai discourse, the
usefulness of Riches' définition (1991) is limited: from a Chai point of
view, much of their violence is not "contestably rendering physical hurt",
but only uncontested, legitimate self-defence, retaliatory or pre-emptive
damaging of enemies, or bénéficiai sacrifice of animais, with which no
one in that context would argue.
Finally, this question of violence being contestable in local Chai terms
would only arise on two accounts: a) when according to the normative
authority figures such as elders and the komoru the people, especially the
younger génération, defy the rules and obligations and act on their own
account, thus changing or undermining the social order; b) when new
forms of aggressively violent and wanton cruel behaviour would appear,
such as rape, torture, hired killing, or nihilistic destruction, well-known
from our Western societies. The possibility that such forms can émerge
may not be precluded (as we know from cases elsewhere in Africa).
Subjectively perceived economie exploitation, unbalanced state interfér-
ence or disturbance, rigidified ethnie boundaries, unsolvable problems of
resource compétition combined with factors like the easy new technology
and power of killing (hand grenades, automatic rifles) may prépare the
ground for it. Also more intangible factors connected to the process of
globalisation, such as the pénétration of a new language of visual images
or of a fantasised reality evoked by, e.g., imported "video-culture", might
enhance this process, invalidating—or at least transforming—codes of
restraint and social order.13 It is known that this has happened in extraor-
dinary situations of disturbance such as in Papua New Guinea, Mozam-
bique, Liberia or Sierra Leone. At present, there is one frontier town
just north of the Suri country where such videos are now becoming readily
13. Its émergence and adoption in Africa should be investigated in detail. The
negative effects of violent and sadistic videos after their displacement to, and
appropriation in, other socio-cultural settings are underestimated.
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available, also for visiting Suri. Such factors might create a new discourse
of violence, which would also mark the inclusion of the Suri into the
globalised domain of displaced signs and commoditised symbols, and
would have an impact on traditional understandings of violent perform-
ance. The Suri have, however, not yet reached this "advanced" stage of
development, and whether the process would mean the émergence of
"more" or "less" violent behaviour cannot be predicted. What seems
likely though is that more state authority in the area will transform cultural
notions and patterns of violence but not necessarily cause their disap-
pearance.
African Studies Centre/Centre d'études africaines, Leiden, 1997.
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ABSTRACT
This article présents an account of the ideological form and practical exercise of
violence among the Suri people, an agro-pastoral group in southern Ethiopia. In
theoretical terms, the général question is addressed of how, on the elementary level
of a small-scale, relatively traditional society without stratification, central leadership
and modern economie features, "violence" is constructed and performed, and how
it partly defines the social persona and collectivity of this group, as opposed to
others. It will be asserted that, while their connections with other ethno-cultural
groups in a partially shared environment and contacts with state forces are not
new—recent developments in this wider societal and political context of the Suri
have an important transformative impact on their patterns of violence.
RÉSUMÉ
Formes rituelles et politiques des pratiques violentes chez les Suri d'Ethiopie mé-
ridionale. — Cet article traite des formes idéologiques et de l'exercice de la violence
chez les Suri, un peuple de pasteurs et d'agriculteurs d'Ethiopie méridionale. Sur
le plan théorique, on s'interroge sur la façon dont, dans cette société traditionnelle
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sans stratification sociale marquée, sans autorité politique centralisée et sans éco-
nomie moderne, la violence est construite et mise en œuvre, et comment elle définit
partiellement les rôles sociaux et les groupes qui composent cette société par
opposition aux collectivités voisines. Bien que les rapports entre les différents
groupes ethniques au sein d'un ensemble régional plus vaste ou que les contacts
avec le ou les États ne sont pas des phénomènes nouveaux, les transformations
récentes qu'a connues la société suri ont modifié de façon sensible leur façon de
gérer la violence.
Keywords//vfofs-c/és:Suri, agro-pastoralism, cultural symbolism, ritual, violence/Sun,
agro-pastoral isme, rituel, symbolisme culturel, violence.

